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l.   Introduction 
 
In a recent issue of Public Choice , Abrams and Schmitz (1978: 29) observe 
that there has been a sizeable '. . . effort . . . devoted to developing the con- 
ceptual framework and seeking empirical support for the "crowding out" 
effect of governmental expenditures.' These authors (1978: 29) also observe 
that there has been some attention in the literature (albeit very limited) 
'. . . directed to assessing the net effect of particular government expendi- 
tures on private spending behavior.' Abrams and Schmitz (1978: 29) then 
proceed to extend the latter literature by analyzing '…a particular cate- 
gory of governmental expenditures - social welfare transfers - and their 
effect on private charitable contributions.' Their overall finding supports 
the thesis that crowding out does in fact occur, but that it is incomplete. 
The findings by Abrams and Schmitz (1978) are at odds with the initial 
studies on crowding out by Anderson and Jordan (1968) and Keran (1969) 
and (1970). The latter three studies conclude that central government 
spending completely crowds out aggregate private-sector spending 1 (i.e., 
total consumer spending plus total investment spending plus net exports). 
On the other hand, the results in Abrams and Schmitz (1978) are, in prin- 
ciple, entirely compatible with those found in Arestis (1979) and Zahn 
(1978). The latter two studies conclude that aggregate private-sector spend- 
ing (consumption plus investment plus net exports) is crowded out by public 
spending, but the crowding out is incomplete. 
The purpose of this note is not to criticize the Abrams and Schmitz study 
(19 78); quite to the contrary, theirs is a very sound paper.  Rather, the 
purpose of this note is to extend the scope of the Abrams and Schmitz study 
(1978). In particular, this note examines the crowding out effect of aggregate 
federal government spending decisions upon purchases of new physical 
capital by private firms. While there obviously are other forms of private sector 
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investment, e.g., net in ventory changes, such  forms  are  omitted  from  this 
study . Like Abrams and Schmitz (1978), we thusly stress  one  particular 
category of crowding out effects. By limiting the analysis solely to private 
investment in new  physical  capital,  the  economic  implications  of  crowding 
out for long-term  inflation  and  short-term  unemployment  resulting  from 
federal government expenditure decisions can be directly high-lighted. Such 
economic implications tend to be obscured in studies such as Anderson and 
Jordan (1968), Keran (1969) an d (1970), Zahn (1978), and  Arestis  (1979), 
where the crowding out effects of central government spending  on  con- 
sumption, investment , and net exports are all aggregated . By avoiding the 
excessive aggregation  characterizing  these  four  studies, we hope to derive - 
as did Abrams and Schmitz (1978) - some unique insights into the ramifica- 
tions  of  federal  government  spending decisions. 
 
 
2. A basic model 
 
Tue empirical studies cited above either (a) measure crowding out indirectly 
through  the examination  of various m ultipliers (see , e.g., Arestis,  1979) or 
(b) measure crowding out directly by treating private-sector spending as a 
function of central governmen t deficits or spending levels per se (see 
Abrams and Schmitz, 1978). 
This note provides an alternative means by which to determine whether 
crowding out occurs and, if so, to what degree. In particular, this study 
examines crowding out by determining to what degree the proportion  of 
actual GNP that was devoted to private in vestmen t in new physical capital 
was affected by the proportion of actual  GNP devoted to federal govern- 
ment spending.  Hopefully,  this  new  approach  to  the  empirical  dimension 
of crowding out will provide further insight into whether or not the crowd- 
ing out issue is substan tive. Moreover, it will enable us to gain some unique 
insights into the ramifications of federal government spending decisions. 
The initial model to be examined is given be : 
I, I, G1 
= -y ( -y  , P, ) (I) 
Y, t t 
where 
I, 
=
 
Y, 
G,
=
 
Y, 
 
 
 
ratio of actual in vestment expenditures on new physical capital 
during quarter t to actual GNP d uring quarter t 
 
ratio of actual aggregate federal government expenditures during 
quarter t to actual GNP during quarter t 
 
P,  =   consumer  price  index  (CPI) during  quarter  r 
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The  data in this regression (as well as in the others included in the pre- 
sent paper) cover  the period  from quarter 1 of year  1969 through quarter 3 
 
of year 1978. This initial model , as well as the other model in this section 
of the paper , does not deal with lagged variables. A distributed lag model is 
introduced in the next section of the paper , however . As noted , the volume 
of 'investment' refers solely to purchases of new plant and capital equip- 
ment. 2 
If crowding out does occur , we would expect that the greater the propor- 
tion of GNP devoted to aggregate federal government spending, the lesser 
the proportion of GNP devoted to private investment in  new  physical 
capital, i.e., the greater the degree to which government  spending crowds 
out such investment , ceteris paribu s : 
-
a (I
'
,
-
/
---
Y
-'
,
-'-- < 0 ( 2) 
a (G,/ Y,) 
The various possible mechanisms through which crowding ou t can occur 
are analyzed in depth in Carlson and Spencer (197 5). This present  note , 
which deals with aggregate federal spending does not address which such 
mechanism is most relevant; such an issue is beyond the scope of this note. 
With regard to the price-level variable, P1, it is argued here that a pattern 
of rising prices leads firms to expect future inflation . Future inflation in 
turn is argued to breed uncertain ty, uncertainty as to whether revenues will 
grow rapidly enough to keep pace with (or outpace) rising production costs. 
This uncertain ty acts to raise the risk associated with investment projects. 
Hence, it is argued that : 
a (Ir/ Y,)  
< 0 (3)
 
aP, 
In order to test these two hypotheses empirically , the following linear 
regression is postulated : 
11 G, 
 
 
where 
= a0 + a 1- + a2 P1 + a 3 
Y, Y1 
 
 
a0   =  constant 
a 3  = error term 
(4) 
 
Estimating (4) by OLS yields: 
I, c 
= + 9 .23579 - 0.03353 _ t - 0.011 !S P, , (5) 
Y, Y, 
(- l.25) (-7.31) 
DF  = 36, R 2  =  .66, F-ratio    =   34.19254 
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investmen t , e .g., net inventory changes, such forms are omitted from this 
stu dy . Like Abrams and Schmitz (1978), we thusly stress one particular 
category of crowding out effects. By limiting the analysis solely to private 
investment in new physical capital, the economic implications of crowding 
out for long-term inflation and short-term unempl oyment resulting from 
federal government expenditu re decisions can be directly high-lighted . Such 
economic im pli cations tend to be obscured in studies such as Anderson and 
Jordan (I968), Keran (l969) and (1970), Zahn (1978), and Arestis (1979), 
where the crowding out effects of central government spending on con- 
sumption, investment, an d net exports are all aggregated . By avoiding the 
excessive aggregation characterizing these four studies, we hope to derive - 
as did Abrams and Schmitz (1978) - some unique insights into the ramifica- 
tions of federal government spen ding decisions. 
 
 
2. A basic model 
 
The empirical studies cited above either (a) measure crowding out indireetly 
through the examination of various multipliers (see, e.g., Arestis, 1979) or 
(b) measure crowdin g out directly by treating private-sector spending as a 
function of central governmen t deficits or spending levels per se (see 
Abrams and Schmitz, 1978). 
This note provides an alternative means by which to determine whether 
crowding out occurs and , if so, to what degree.  In particular , this study 
examines crowding ou t by determining to what degree the proportion  of 
actual GNP that was devoted to private in vestment in new physical capital 
was affected by the proportion of  actual  GN P devoted to federal govern- 
men t spending. Hopefully , this  new  approach  to  the  empirical  dimension 
of crowding out will provide further insight into whether or not the crowd- 
ing out issue is substantive. Moreover , it will enable us to gain some unique 
insights in to the ramifications of federal government spending decisions. 
The initial model to be examined is given be : 
f t f t G, 
= 
Y, 
where 
f, 
=
 
y 
-- ( -- , P,) (l ) 
Y, Y, 
 
 
 
ratio of actual investment expenditures on new physical capital 
t 
G, 
=
 
Y, 
during quarter t to actual GNP during t 
 
ratio of actual aggregate federal government expen ditures during 
quarter t to actual G NP during quarter t 
 
P, = consumer price index (CPI) during quarter t 
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sent paper) cover the period from quarter 1 of year 1969 through quarter 3 
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of year  I 978. This initial model, as well as the other model in this section 
of the paper , does not deal with lagged variables. A distributed lag model is 
introduced in the next section of the paper , however . As noted , the volume 
of 'investment' refers solely to purchases of new plant and capital equip- 
ment.2 
If crowding out does occur, we would expect that the greater the propor- 
tion of GNP devoted to  aggregate  federal government  spending, the lesser 
the proportion of GNP devoted to private investment  in  new  physical 
capital, i.e., the greater the  degree  to  which  government  spending crowds 
out such investment , ceteris paribus : 
o (I,/ Y,)  
< 0 (2)
 
o ( G,/ Y,) 
The various possible mechanisms through which crowding out can occur 
are analyzed in depth in Carlson and Spencer (1975). This  present  note, 
which deals with aggregate federal spending does not address which such 
mechanism is most relevant ; such an issue is beyond the scope of this note. 
With regard to the price-level variable , P,, it is argued here that a pattern 
of rising prices leads firms to expect future inflation . Future inflation in 
turn is argued to breed uncertainty , uncertainty as to whether revenues will 
grow rapidly enough to keep pace with (or outpace) rising production costs. 
This uncertainty acts to raise the risk associated with investment projects. 
Hence , it is argued that : 
o (I ,/ Y 1)   < 0 (3)
 
aP, 
In order to test these two hy potheses empirically, the following linear 
regression is postulated: 
I , = a 0 + a G, + a2 
l' 
 
 
where 
1- 
Y, Y, 
 
 
a 0   =  constant 
a 3 = error term 
t + a 3 (4) 
 
Estima ting (4) by OLS yields: 
11  
= + 9 .23579 - 0 003353 
G, 
- 0.0 l ll5 P  , 
 
(5) 
Y, Y, 
(- L 25) (- 7 .3 l ) 
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where terms in parentheses are t-values. 
In equation (5), both coefficients have the expected negative signs. Th.e 
coefficient on the government spending variable is significant at about the 
.I 0 level, providing evidence , albeit rather weak , that federal government 
spending 'crowds out' private-sector investmen t in new  plant  and  equip- 
ment. The coefficient on the price-level variable is significant at well beyond 
the .01 level, providing very strong support for the hypothesis that the 
uncertainty created by an inflationary environment acts to markedly dis- 
courage private-sector investment. The R 2 of .66 implies that the model 
explains two-thirds of the variation in the dependent variable. 
Although the results in (5) do lend some support to the crowding-out 
thesis, this support is not especially strong, i.e., a coefficient with a .10 
significance level is not sufficiently convincing. In an effort (a) to provide 
a 'more complete ' model of investment and (b) to try to provide yet further 
insigh t in to the crowding-out phenomenon , the following model is now 
offered : 
 
(6) 
 
where  
 
b0   =   constant 
b4  =  error term 
D, =  an index for quarter t of expected versus actual selling prices 
and retail trade; these data are an indication of the degree to 
which businessmen 's actual selling prices and retail trade fell 
below their expected selling prices and retail trade ; the data are 
based u pon a Dun and Bradstreet survey of 250 businesses 3 
 
In this system, D, is a measure of the degree to which businesses' selling 
prices and retail trade fall below expectations. As a form of 'disappointment 
index,' it follows that th e greater the degree to which selling prices and 
retail trade fall short of expectations that is, the greater the value of D, - 
the lower the degree of optimism firms are likely to hold toward new invest- 
ment projects. In other words, disappointment over the selling prices and 
retail trade associated with the existing capital stock is lilrnly to breed 
skepticism about the expected profitability (DPV) of new physical capital. 
Ceteribus paribus , then, it is expected that : 
a (I ,/ Y,) 
aD, 
< O 0) 
The OLS estimation of (6) is given by: 
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- 
1 
 
I, 
= + 9.18261 -- 0.04362 
G, 
- 0.01068 P, - 0.02435D, , (8) 
Y, Y, 
(-1.88) (-7.88) (-3.34) 
DF  = 35, R 2   = .74, F-ratio   =  32.91343 
In equation (8), all three coefficients have the expected signs. Moreover , 
all three coefficients are significant at beyond the .05 level. The R 2 of .74 
implies that the model now explains essentially three-fourths of the varia- 
tion in (I,/ Y,). As in regression (5), the F-ratio is significant at well beyond 
the .01 level. 
The coefficient on the price-level variable is, as was the case in estimation 
(5), significant at well beyond the .01 level, implying that an inflationary 
environment acts to significantly discourage private investment in new 
physical capital. Similarly, the coefficient for the D, index is significant at 
beyond the .01 level, implying that when firms' selling prices and retail sales 
fall short of expectations, a disincentive to undertake additional investment 
in new physical capital is created. 
The coefficient on variable (G,/ Y,) is statistically significant at beyond 
the .05 level. This lends strong empirical support to the crowding out thesis 
and , since the coefficient in (8) - like that in (5) - implies incomplete 
crowding out , these results are consistent with Arestis (1979), Abrams and 
Schmitz (1978), and Zahn (1978). 
 
 
3. A distributed lag model 
 
In the estimations above, there are no time lags introduced. In addition, 
both of the above models neglect to include a measure of firms' actual 
profits. Finally, neither of the above models includes a variable to allow for 
the effects on investment of the various phases of the business cycle, i.e., 
neither includes a variable which would explicitly allow for the effects on 
investment of changes in real GNP (that occur over the cycle). In an effort 
to allow for these considerations, the following regression is estimated : 
1 
= c0 
G1 
+ c, -- + c2P,_ 1 + c ,D , + c4 
 
n,_ 2 + c s Yf_ .. 2 
 
+ c6 
 
(9) 
 
where 
Y, Y1 
 
 
c0 = constant 
c 6 =  error term 
n1 _ 2   =  corporate profit  rate, after taxes, in quarter t -2, expressed 
as a percentage  rate of return  on stockholders' equity4 
Y;""_ 2  =  real GNP level in quarter t -25 
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It is argued here that the greater the corporate profit rate , the greater the 
pool of funds potentially available for internally financed investment and 
the greater the firms' level of optimism. For either or both of these reasons, 
it may be argued that the greater the profit rate in a given quarter - given 
the time lag in investment decisions - the greater the investment under- 
taken two quarters later , ceteris paribu s : 
a (l,/ Y,)  > 0 (10) 
a rr,   z 
Finally , the variable Y(:._ 2 is included to allow for the impact that changes 
in real GNP exercise over investment in new capital. As real GNP rises, in 
accord  with  the  'conventional  wisdom,'  firms become  willing  to  undertake 
more investment ; on the other hand , a declining real GNP acts to discourage 
investment. Hence , it follows that: 
a (J,/ Y,)  
> 0 (11)
 
a Y,*_ 2 
Inclusion of this lagged variable directly allows for the effects of the various 
phases of the business cycle on investment behavior . 
Aside from lagging the profit and real GNP variables, the price-level 
variable has been lagged (one quarter , in this case). It was found that a 
variety of other lag variations yielded much the same results as those in the 
OLS estimation below: 
I, G, 
=  + 8.45116 - 0.2 2217 - 
Y, Y, 
(-2.43) 
0.00784P,_ 1 - 0.03010D, 
(-5.03) (-4.01) 
+ 0.00817 rr, _ 2  + 0.08436 Yf_ 2 
(+ 2.28) (+ 1.89) 
DF  =  33, R 2   =  .79, F-ratio   =   27.51314 
(12) 
 
All five of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the .05 level or beyond . The R 2 is .79 , so that the 
model now explains nearly four-fif ths of the variation in the dependent 
variable. Finally , the F-ratio is significan t at well beyond the .01 level. 
As in estimation (8), the inflation and selling price/ retail  sales variables 
both act to significantly discourage private investment. The profit and real 
GNP variables both act here as significant factors in stimulating private 
investment , as hypothesized . Finally , we once again find strong empirical 
support for crowding out. In fact , the  coefficient  for  (G,/ Y,) in  (12) is 
much larger than in either of the  earlier  cases; moreover , its  significance 
level  also  is  much  higher . Nevertheless,  the evidence  in (12) indicates that 
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although crowding out is of considerable  magnitude , it is still incomplete ; 
this  is  compatible  with  the finding by  Abrams  and Schmitz (1978:  36) of 
'. . . less-than-total crowding out . . . for society as a whole.' As was the case 
in Abrams and Schmitz (1978), each dollar of federal outlays (in the aggreg- 
ate) reduces private investment by roughly 22 cents. 
 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
 
This note has ad d ressed  the empirical issue of crowding out by examining 
the proportion of GNP devoted to private investment in new physical capital 
as a function of the proportion of GNP devoted  to  federal  government 
outlays. Three alternative models were estimated , all of which found evi- 
dence of (a) a definite pattern  in which  private investment  is crowded  out 
by government spending and (b) only partial, i.e., incomplete , crowding out. 
These findings are, in principle, compatible with the studies by Arestis 
(1979), Abrams  and  Schmitz (1978), and Zahn  (1978). 
We may infer at least two important policy implications from the above 
findings. First , federal government decisions which act to raise federal out- 
lays tend to diminish private-sector investmen t in new physical capital. To 
the degree that this form of crowding out occurs, private sector unemploy- 
ment is generated. This clearly acts to weaken the stimulatory direct effects 
of the increased federal spending. Second , to the extent that federal govern- 
ment spen ding decisions lead to diminished  investment  in new physical 
ca pital, the rate of capital formation is diminished . This tends to worsen 
long-term inflation by cu tting down on the ability of aggregate productive 
capacity to keep pace with aggregate demand . 
The two implications stated above cast potentially  grave doubts upon 
the wisdom of federal government decisions that lead to increased federal 
outlays. Ideally, at the very least , each such spending decision should be 
scrutinized for its particular impact on investment in new physical capital. 
Clearly, although federal  government  expenditures  in the aggregate lead 
to diminished private investment , certain specific forms of federal spending 
may not change private investment at all, whereas other forms of federal 
spending ma y even lead to increased investment. The latter could well be 
characteristic of federal outlays for new highwa y construction. Thus, there 
appears to be a pressing need to disaggregate according to federal spending 
type. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Rela ted  to  the theoretical issue of complete net crowding out, see Carlson and 
Spencer (1975). 
2. Data sources for It.  Y t, Gt , and Pt were The Economic Report  of  the President , 
various issues. 
3. The  data  were  obtained  from  The Bu siness  Conditions Digest , February , 1979, 
and  October,  1979. 
4. Data source: The Business Conditions Digest , September, 1979. 
5. Data source: Economic Report of the President , various issues. 
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